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Abstract
This paper develops a general equilibrium model to measure welfare eects of taxes
for correcting environmental externalities caused by domestic trade, focusing on exter-
nalities that arise through exports. Externalities from exports come from a number of
sources. Domestically owned ships, planes, and automobiles can become contaminated
while visiting other regions and bring unwanted pests home, and species can be in-
troduced by contaminated visitors that enter a region to consume goods and services.
The paper combines insights from the public nance literature on corrective environ-
mental taxes and trade literature on domestically provided services. We nd that past
methods for measuring welfare eects are inadequate for a wide range of externalities
and show the most widely used corrective mechanism, taxes on the sector imposing the
environmental externality, may often do more harm than good. The motivation for this
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1paper is the expansion of invasive species' ranges within the United States. We apply
our analytical model to the specic example of quagga and zebra mussel (Dreissena
polymorpha and Dreissena rostiformis bugenis) invasion into the U.S Pacic Northwest.
Keywords: environmental regulation, tax interactions, invasive species, environment
and trade
JEL Codes: Q20, Q26, Q27, Q56, Q57, F18
1 Introduction
The trade and environment literature has recently focused on externalities due to contact
with trade partners, particularly with regard to import goods and invasive species (see for
example Perrings et al. [32], McAusland and Costello [24], Margolis et al. [22], and Knowler
and Barbier [19]). As these authors have pointed out, trade is much like any other risky
behavior in which humankind partakes. Agents must balance risk of contamination with
enhanced opportunities from multiple trade partners. Well informed agents can optimally
manage this risk by choosing private or public methods of protection and insurance [34].
Work along these lines has focused on externalities introduced through imports (particu-
larly with regard to invasive species), and largely ignored the contact with trade partners
through exports and trade in domestically provided services. Externalities from exports
come from a number of sources. Domestically owned ships, planes, and automobiles can
become contaminated while visiting other regions and bring unwanted pests home, and
species can be introduced by contaminated visitors that enter a region to consume goods
and services. Following the the trade literature [10, 25, 37, 8, 9], consumption of goods and
services by nonresidents are modeled as exports, as money ows from outside the region
2to local rms and households.1
Dierentiating between import- and export-related externalities determines the ability
of agents to manage the associated risk. Consumption of imports can be taxed in a way that
internalizes cost of environmental damages within the regional economy. Exports oer no
such possibility. We show that taxes on the sector imposing the environmental externality
may do more harm than good when exports are the culprit even though they successfully
reduce exposure to risk; public methods of protection may be counterproductive. Our
results contrast, for example, McAusland and Costello [24] who nd that the optimal
tax on imports of potentially invasive species is generally positive.2 Because exports are
produced with local factors of production, levying a tax could cause declines in domestic
production, and thus local income, large enough to oset any welfare gains from correcting
the environmental problem. We examine this problem in a general equilibrium model
with a preexisting labor tax and present new welfare eects necessary for studying a wide
range of externalities beyond those found in the public nance literature on environmental
regulation and tax interactions.34
The motivation for this paper is the domestic spread of invasive species. It is the
rst paper to focus on human mediated domestic spread despite growing concern among
policy makers and ecologists about within-country dispersal. Of 100 of the World's Worst
1The tourism industry, for example, can be described by purchases of domestic goods and services by
nonresidents. Large hospitals often serve patients from outside of the region, and recipients of outsourced
work are essentially in the business of exporting factors of production.
2In a model with taxes and inspections, they nd optimal taris are non-negative, and equal to zero if
and only if inspection is costless and detection is perfect.
3There is a well-established literature on welfare eects of environmental taxes, including Bovenberg and
de Mooij [5], Bovenberg and van der Ploeg [6], Parry [29], Goulder [14], Goulder et al. [15], Fullerton and
Metcalf [13], and Williams [40].
4Recent ndings of a sh virus (viral hemorrhagic septicemia) havr restricted interstate transport of live
bait in the Great Lakes area. Other examples of externalities from exported services and visitor consumption
are automobile exhaust [31], diver impact of coral reefs [17], and pollution tied to sporting events [7]. While
these externalities are well know, little has been said about the welfare eects of policies to correct these
externalities.
3Invasive Alien Species listed in the Global Invasive Species Database [21], 86 species have
been introduced into the United States or are increasing their range within the United
States, seven species are indigenous or non-threatening to other areas of the U.S., and seven
have not been introduced.5 These species are often introduced near major ports of entry
as `hitchhikers' on international transporters, and following introduction and colonization,
hitchhiking on domestic transportation expands the species' range. A species is deemed
invasive, as opposed to simply nonnative, if it causes economic or ecological damages in
the ecosystems where it is newly established.
We apply our model to the threat of invasion by zebra and quagga mussels (Dreissena
polymorpha and Dreissena rostiformis bugenis, hereafter collectively referred to as dreis-
senids) into the Columbia River Basin. Following an invasion, dreissenids cover surfaces
and clog intake pipes for industries dependent on water, requiring costly installation of
mitigation equipment and additional personnel to monitor and control the eects. They
are also prolic lter feeders, causing ecosystem-wide eects in the bodies of water they
invade. They compete with native mussels [33] and have been linked to declines in catches
and conditions of sport sh [16, 23, 26, 36] and lost recreational opportunities [38].
The Columbia River Basin is an ideal case study for several reasons. First, the basin's
location in the Pacic Northwest has protected it from introduction from non-U.S. sources.
Dreissenids arrived in the U.S. through shipping channels connecting the East Coast and
Europe. The only realistic vectors of introduction into the basin are of U.S. origin. Sec-
ond, the Rocky Mountains and the Continental Divide have provided barriers of natural
introduction. No body of water in the Columbia River Basin is directly connected to any
currently invaded body of water making within-stream dispersal impossible. Introduction
must occur through overland transport, of which trailerd boats are the most likely vector.
5These gures include introduction into and between Hawaii and U.S. island territories. Included in the
seven not currently present are two seaweeds, a seastar, and a comb jelly.
4Such boats can be easily inspected at launch sites and checkpoints along the roadways.
Third, a dreissenid invasion is expected to impact recreational shing in the Columbia
River Basin, a regionally signicant economic activity. Nearly 4 million recreational sh-
ing licenses, permits, and stamps were sold to anglers in the Columbia River Basin in 2007,
over 700,000 of which were to non-residents [12]. Two million individuals spent $50 million
on licenses, and according to the American Sportshing Association [1], added $3 billion to
the local economies. Finally, we have data on the suitability of basin waters as dreissenid
habitat and on boat movement between these bodies of water and infested regions of the
U.S. [35, 11, 3, 4, 39]. Bossenbroek et al. [4] estimate the overland boat trac potentially
infected with dreissenid mussels traveling to the Columbia River Basin in a given year.
The mere threat of invasion these boats carry has already caused impacts in the region.
In what follows the analytical model is developed and analytical welfare eects of an
environmental tax for this class of externality are derived in the fashion of Bovenberg and
de Mooij [5], Fullerton and Metcalf [13], and Williams [40]. The method is implemented
in a regional computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for the Columbia River Basin
and lost welfare associated with uncertainty and welfare eects of corrective taxes are
calculated. A brief discussion concludes.
2 Analytical Model
In a general equilibrium setting a regional rm provides goods to two utility maximizing
consumers, a resident and a visiting nonresident. There is some chance of introduction
of a nonnative species that depends on the level of sales to the visiting consumer. This
uncertainty enters the model exogenously through the non-resident, as they are unaware
of its presence, and is assumed to only be of direct consequence to the expected prot
maximizing rm. If an invasion occurs, the rm must adopt a less ecient production
5technology. A government agent levies a tax on sales to nonresident consumers in order to
reduce the probability of an invasion. These tax revenues are used to lower a preexisting
labor tax. Price for the consumption good and wages adjust until the goods and labor
markets clear, ensuring general equilibrium. The assumptions of the analytical model
match the behavioral specications of the computational model presented in section four.
2.1 Assumptions
A price-taking domestic rm produces a good using only labor. The product is sold to
a resident and visiting nonresident consumer. The rm cannot distinguish between the
resident and nonresident consumers and charges a single price in the marketplace. The
probability of invasion (XNR) increases with the total amount of goods (XNR) sold to
the nonresident. The rm does not account for this eect in its optimization problem,
perhaps because it believes its own contribution to the problem is miniscule.6 A successful
invasion degrades environmental quality, forcing the rm to use a less ecient production
technology. Faced with this uncertainty, the rm chooses labor to maximize expected
prots,
 = P[F(L;QI) + (1   )F(L;QN)]   wL (1)
where F(L;Q) is the production function, L is the amount of labor input, Q is environ-
mental quality, P is the price of the good, and w is the wage rate. Superscripts denote
invaded (I) and non-invaded (N) states of the environment. Total production must be
greater than or equal to total consumption (X), and because the rm cannot distinguish
between resident (R) and nonresident (NR) consumers, F(L;Q)  X = XR + XNR.
The production process is constant returns to scale, X = L(Q), and production units
are normalized so (QN) = 1 without invasion and (QI) =   1 with invasion. We also
6This assumption also allows for modeling consistency with Williams [40] and similar papers.
6normalize the price of the domestically produced consumption good to unity. The expected
prots of the rm are
 = L + (1   )L   wL (2)
A zero prot condition implies that labor earns its expected marginal product
w =  + (1   ) (3)
The rm's optimization problem denes the supply of the good and demand for labor as a
function of the real wage, X = Xs(w) and L = Ld(w).
A representative domestic household maximizes utility by consuming the domestic good
(XR) and enjoying leisure (l). The household is endowed with T units of time that are
divided between labor (L) and leisure. The household receives income from labor, any
rm prots, and government transfers (G). The household makes its consumption decision
knowing the wage oered by the rm and the price of the consumption good. Uncertainty,
therefore, does not aect the consumption decision of the household except for an indirect
eect on wages as shown in the rm's decision problem. Household income is used to
purchase the consumption good and to pay the tax on labor at rate L. The household has
utility function
U(XR;l) (4)
and faces budget and time constraints
wL(1   L) +  + G = XR (5)
L + l = T (6)
We assume the utility function is continuous and quasi-concave. Letting  be the marginal
7utility of wealth, the rst order conditions for the household with respect to XR and l are
UX = ; Ul = (1   L)w (7)
The rst order conditions implicitly dene Marshallian demand functions for the consump-
tion good XR(w;L;;G) and the supply of labor Ls(w;L;;G).
A representative nonresident gets utility from consuming the local good in amount XNR.
The good is immobile so consumption must take place within the region of production.7
The nonresident also consumes a similar product in his home region (XF) with price PF
that is an imperfect substitute for the local good. In order to purchase the local good, the
visiting consumer must pay the price for the domestic good plus an additional tax (NR).
Since rms cannot distinguish between the consumers, we assume the tax on the visitor
is in the form of an entry fee or a surcharge on nonresidents charged and collected by the
government agent (e.g., toll booth at the state border or an out-of-state shing license).
The visitor has utility function
V (XNR;XF) (8)
and faces budget constraint
M = P(1 + NR)XNR + PFXF (9)
The visitor's utility function is assumed to be continuous and quasi-concave with income
M exogenous. Letting  be the marginal utility of the nonresident's wealth, the rst order
7Examples of such goods include locally provided services like hospital services, hotel lodging, mechanic
work, haircuts, and guided shing trips.
8conditions for the nonresident with respect to the domestic and foreign goods are
VXNR = (1 + NR); VXF = PF (10)
The rst order conditions implicitly dene a Marshallian demand function for nonresident
consumption XNR(NR;PF), which we assume to be a normal good.
A government agent initially only taxes labor income and redistributes the revenues
back to the resident household in a lump sum amount G. Given a chance nonnative
species are introduced, the government levies an additional tax on consumption of the
visiting nonresident, hereafter referred to as the environmental tax. Revenues from the
environmental tax are used to lower the labor tax. Total government revenues, and thus
total government transfers to the resident, are xed at G regardless of the tax mix. The
government budget constraint is
G = LwL + NRXXR (11)
2.2 Equilibrium
The maintained assumption is that all choices are made ex-ante to an invasion, but the
threat of invasion persists. General equilibrium is achieved through adjustment of the price
and wage until supply of the good equals the sum of demand from the resident household
and nonresident visitor, demand for labor equals supply of labor, and the government
balances its budget.
Given the derived demand and supply functions, the goods market clears when price
adjusts so X = XR + XNR, and the wage adjusts until the labor market clears, Ld = Ls.
With neither a labor tax nor threat of invasion, the resident's equilibrium marginal rate of
substitution of leisure for consumption would equal the marginal revenue product of labor
9to the rm. Both the labor tax and the threat of invasion, however, cause distortions in
the labor market. With a labor tax the resident withholds labor that would have otherwise
gone on the market, causing a higher wage rate than without the distortion. The threat of
invasion counters this eect by lowering the expected productivity of labor, causing lower
wages than would otherwise exist.
All tax revenues are redistributed to the resident. This guarantees the government
maintains a balanced budget and satises the nal equilibrium requirement. Combining the
market clearing conditions in the goods and labor market provides an aggregate resource





The rm cannot distinguish between resident and nonresident consumers, so the resource
constraint also denes the economy's transformation function, with a constant elasticity of
transformation of one between domestic and foreign consumption. A one unit change in
demand for the good, regardless of which consumer changes its demand, causes a one unit
change in labor demanded.
3 Welfare Eects
Levying the environmental tax decreases the visitor's demand for the good and lowers the
probability of an invasion. Because risk of production ineciencies fall the rm demands
more labor, produces more output, and wages rise. Taxing the visitor's consumption also
allows the government to lower the tax on labor, releasing more labor into the marketplace.
This further raises income to the resident. Increasing the price to the foreign consumer,
however, may cause the aggregate quantity demanded to fall. If this happens, labor de-
10manded will fall accordingly and household income may fall. The net change in household
welfare depends on the change in output and the demand for labor relative to the change
in the wage rate. All else equal, a lower probability of invasion increases the real wage and
causes unambiguous welfare gains. The following analysis concerns itself with the inherent
tradeos involved with using a tax to achieve this means and the interaction aects with
a preexisting tax.
A large literature exists on potential gains from an environmental tax that may exist
beyond correcting the externality, often known as the `double dividend' hypothesis. Oates
[28] reviews this literature and discusses the existence of the double dividend. Although
we follow these basic methods to assess welfare eects, direct comparisons are not clear
given the cause of externalities in this literature. In previous studies, externalities generally
arise from resident consumption with no mention of nonresidents. For example, the tax-
interaction eect, the ability of an environmental tax to raise the price of that good in
relation to leisure and compound the distortion in the labor market, does not exist in our
model since the price of the dirty good only rises for nonresidents. In addition, in our
primary welfare eect, or Pigouvian eect, there are both positive and negative elements:
nonresident consumption increases the probability of invasion (negative externality) and
brings income to the resident household (positive externality).8 We, therefore, refer to
the negative externality in the primary welfare eect and the positive externality in the
primary welfare eect in our discussion of welfare changes. Direct comparisons can be
made between our model and those in previous studies for the revenue recycling eect [14],
which describes the ability of an environmental tax to raise public revenues and decrease
other distortionary taxes.
Our main result for the net welfare eect from the environmental tax is summarized
8Goulder et al. [15] has a model with revenue recycling, tax-interaction, and primary welfare eects,
though they only consider welfare eect tied to negative externalities.
















XNR is the price elasticity for visitor demand.
Equation (13) shows the two main components of the welfare eect of the tax, termed
the revenue recycling eect and the primary welfare eect. Welfare changes for the resi-
dent are determined by the relative sizes of changes in labor and nonresident consumption
through these eects and are, a priori, ambiguous. The revenue recycling eect is captured
by the rst two terms on the right side of (13) and represent changes in labor tax payments
following introduction of the environmental tax. Levying the tax on the nonresident con-
sumer allows the government to lower the tax on labor. dL
dNR < 0 is the eciency of the
tax tradeo, and  wL dL
dNR > 0 is the amount of labor tax savings, which allows resident
income to rise. The magnitude of this part of the revenue recycling eect depends on the
revenue raising eciency of the two taxes and labor income.
Reducing nonresident consumption lowers the probability of invasion and increases the
expected productivity of labor. Higher wages require the resident household to pay more
in labor taxes, given by  LL dw
dNR < 0. The magnitude of this part depends on the ability
of the tax to inuence the probability of invasion, the expected productivity of labor,
and the equilibrium wage. Because adjustment of the labor tax is the primary means of
compensating the resident for the externality, we assume that the sum of these two terms,
and thus the revenue recycling eect, is positive.9
The primary welfare eect (third and fourth terms on right side of (13)) deviates from
other studies and is indeterminate due to the countervailing positive and negative external-
9The rise in labor productivity could be considered part of the benet-side tax-interaction eect in
Williams [40], but as the larger eect involves the benet from reduced taxes, we consider the total change
in labor tax payments the revenue recycling eect.
12ities. Note that w depends on the probability of invasion , and the probability of invasion













(   1)  0 (15)
(15) shows the relationship between the elasticity of nonresident demand and the elasticity
of wage with respect to the environmental tax. Dening  = dw
d(1+NR)
1+NR
w , we can write
 = w=(XNR(   1)0(XNR))  0.
The sign of  XNR(1+) depends on the visiting consumer's elasticity of demand. This
term reects the ability to correct the externality by leveraging nonresident consumption.
If nonresident demand is inelastic, j  j< 1, the third term will be negative and the marginal
eect of the tax becomes more negative with higher levels of nonresident consumption. If
nonresident demand is elastic, j  j> 1, taxes cause large changes in nonresident demand,
and welfare gains from the primary welfare eect are leveraged by nonresident consumption.
The sign of the last expression (1 ) dL
dNR depends on the sign of dL, as (1 ) > 0
is the share of the wage inuenced by the threat of an invasion. If the elasticity of demand
is highly elastic, the two terms in the primary welfare eect work in opposition. Small
increases in the tax cause large reductions in XNR and large reductions in labor demand
dL, leaving the overall direction of the primary welfare eect ambiguous without further
restrictions. However, if demand is only slightly elastic, XNR is not sensitive to changes in
the tax and dL is small, and the primary welfare eect is negative.
The sum of all eects hinges on a key economic behavioral parameter, the elasticity of
13nonresident demand, and its relationship with a key parameter at the intersection of the
economic and ecological processes, the probability of invasion. If demand is highly elastic,
the environmental tax is not likely an eective way to raise government revenues; we would
expect  wL dL
dNR to be close to zero. The tax, however, is an eective tool to correct the
externality and raise the real wage. A higher wage also leads to higher labor tax payments
by the resident;  LL dw
dNR would rise. If  wL dL
dNR tends to zero in the limit, total welfare
increases if and only if
 XNR(1 + ) > LL
dw
dNR




The inequality in (16) will only be satised if small changes in the tax rate have little to
no eect on wages and labor. However, the opposite was assumed to derive (16), making
it unlikely. For the case of highly elastic nonresident demand we therefore expect an
environmental tax to lead to a welfare loss for the resident.
For the opposite case of very inelastic nonresident demand, changes in labor and wage
are small. Approximating  LL dw
dNR and (1 ) dL
dNR at zero in the limit, resident welfare
will rise (fall) if the sum of  XNR(1 + ) < 0 and  wL dL
dNR > 0 is positive (negative). In
this case, a corrective environmental tax increases resident welfare by generating enough
government revenue to lower labor taxes.
In summary, with highly elastic demand, taxing nonresident consumption causes large
drops in labor demand. Income to the resident falls more than gains from higher wages
and labor tax savings. If demand is inelastic, taxing the visiting consumer hardly reduces
the probability of invasion, but labor income remains relatively unchanged. The resident
household benets through the reduction in labor taxes. An environmental tax can lead
to welfare gains to the resident only if demand is inelastic, but not by correcting the
externality. Should conditions exist to correct the externality (demand is elastic), lost
14labor demand hurts the resident household more than extra income from higher wages and
lower taxes.
4 Columbia River Basin as an Example
In the spirit of Goulder [14] and Goulder et al. [15], we apply the analytical model to
a CGE model of a potential dreissenid invasion into the Columbia River Basin and the
eects of a tax on nonresident recreational anglers aimed at preventing this invasion. The
application implements the analytical model and provides numerical results that are the
net of the indeterminate analytical results, explicitly modeling the probability of invasion,
expanding the analysis to an economy with nine producing sectors, nine representative
households, state and federal government agents that levy taxes on labor, and expanding
our treatment of the production process to include capital and intermediate inputs. Other
than the added complexity, all model and agent behavioral assumptions are identical to
those of the analytical model. In the Columbia River Basin context, nonresident refers to
all consumers living outside of the basin, and trade is dened as all economic exchange with
U.S. residents living outside the basin and consumers living outside of the U.S. Hicksian
equivalent variations are used to measure welfare changes.
Visitors enter the Columbia River Basin to `consume' shing and boating experiences.
To the extent that one shing location is not a perfect substitute for another, the experience
must be consumed within the basin. Production of the shing experience (providing shing
licenses, hotels, restaurants, etc.) uses Columbia River Basin factors of production and is an
important source of regional income. Visiting anglers also bring risk of dreissenid invasion
to the Columbia River Basin, mainly through unintentional transport of dreissenids aboard
trailored boats. Because invasion caused by any one boater is likely to lead to widespread
damages, we model the probability of invasion as a weak-link public good as in Perrings
15et al. [32] and Horan et al.[18]. We assume the habitat is conducive to host the invasive
species [11] and all visitors' actions are exactly alike in that they carry the same probability
of invasion (q).
The probability that successful introduction occurs by any visiting boater is
(n) = Pr(Z  1) = 1  
n Y
i=1
(1   qi) = 1   (1   q)n (17)
where Z is the number of times the invasive species invades the ecosystem. The probability
increases with the number of visiting boaters, n, and as n approaches innity, invasion is
virtually certain.
Bossenbroek et al. [4] describes boater movement throughout the country and gives
the number of boats traveling to or within the Columbia River Basin in relation to other
regions in the U.S. Updating the 2006 work to account for post-2007 invasion in other
regions of the Western U.S., Bossenbroek (unpublished data) nd the current probability
of a successful invasion (n) into the Columbia River Basin to be as high as 75 percent
over the next twenty years.10 The predicted relative number of boats n is 2,138. This
corresponds to a per boat probability of invasion of 0.065 percent.
Large industrial sectors of the Columbia River Basin will be aected by a dreissenid
invasion, particularly industries such as power and agriculture that depend on the services
of large federal dams. Production in our CGE model occurs in a bi-level nest. The rst
nest combines capital and labor in a CES function to form a composite primary factor
of production. The second nest combines this primary factor with intermediate inputs in
10The rst of an increasing number of dreissenid mussel populations was discovered in the western United
States in 2007, at least 1,600 kilometers west of previously known established populations. Initial invasions
into the West were most likely a result of boater movements across the continent [3], but new beachheads
of invasion exist in Colorado, specically Pueblo Reservoir and Lake Granby, and the Colorado River
watershed. Established populations in Lakes Mead and Powell have already led to downstream spread to
the California Aqueduct and multiple reservoirs in California.
16a Leontief production function, retaining the constant returns to scale assumption in the
analytical model. For computational purposes, we model the dual problem for the rm,
representing each sector with a cost-minimizing rm. Our nine production sectors are
state and municipal power generation, federal power generation, independent power pro-
duction, municipal water, irrigated agriculture, non-irrigated agriculture, sh hatcheries,
recreational shing, and a catchall miscellaneous sector. Of these, we expect signicant
eciency losses in production for all power generation, municipal water, and irrigated
agriculture.
Costs to rms are composed of primary costs (payments to labor and capital), costs
of purchasing intermediate inputs, and indirect business taxes. The inuence on industry
costs by zebra mussel invasion is introduced to the model by factor productivity shocks.
Following a zebra mussel invasion, aected industries respond by installing mitigation
equipment and hiring people to monitor and control the eects, leading to eciency losses.
The dual equivalent of these factor productivity shocks are reected in the primary factor
cost (PV Ck
11) functions' eciency parameters
(k) 1 = k(N
k ) 1 (18)
where k is the percentage change in industry k costs induced by the dreissenid invasion
and N
k is the sector's eciency parameter in the absence of any cost impacts.
Primary costs are a function of regional output (DYi), regional rental rate of capital (R),
and the regional wage rate (W). They also depend on value added distribution parameters
(i), industry specic partial elasticities of substitution in value added (i), and industry
11k = fstate and municipal power generation facilities, federal power generation facilities, independent
power producers, municipal and industrial water users, sh hatcheries, irrigated agricultureg
17specic value added eciency parameters (i).
PV Ci = (i) 1DYi[
i
i W1 i + (1   i)iR1 i]1=(1 i) (19)
Under threat of invasion, expected primary costs become
E[PV Ci] = k(N
i ) 1DYi[
i




i W1 i + (1   i)iR1 i]1=(1 i)
or
E[PV Ci] = PV CN
i (21)



















i are the factor demands without the threat of an invasion. To produce the
same output as in the absence of an invasion, rms increase their factor demands, increasing
costs of production and the price of the domestic good. Faced with higher prices, quantity
demanded falls. The welfare eect of a dreissenid invasion depends on the relative size of
the increases in domestic prices and payments to factors, which the households own.
Welfare changes are measured by the sum across households of equivalent variations
following the tax policy. Each household has a nested utility function where the upper
level represents the household's choice between total consumption (X) and leisure (l).
This specication mirrors the optimization problem in the analytical model, where X now
18represents a composite of consumption goods. Each household maximizes
H = [(1   )1=LX(L 1)=L + 1=Ll(L 1)=L]L=(L 1) (24)
subject to
I = PX + W(1   L)l (25)
where  is the percentage of total labor endowment devoted to leisure in the benchmark
data, I is after-savings income, and L is the elasticity of substitution between consumption








where PQi is the price consumers face for good i, i;h is the share of expenditures household
h spends on good i, and h is the elasticity of substitution for goods for household h.







[w(1   L)]L (27)
with the h subscript suppressed for each household. (27) is equivalent to (7) for the
functional forms employed. We rearrange and use the household time constraint to get
labor supplied by each household




[w(1   L)]L X (28)
We use Ballard et al. [2] measurements for elasticity of substitution between leisure and
consumption and percentage of labor endowment initially devoted towards leisure.12
12Their model has values for twelve household groups whereas our model has nine households; we, there-
19All nonresidents are required to have a shing license to sh in the Columbia River
Basin. Our analysis considers an additional tax on out-of-state licenses that reduces the
number of trips by nonresident boaters into the region and reduces the probability of
invasion and the associated externality. We assume regulators cannot distinguish between
anglers from zebra mussel regions and other out-of-state anglers, so all nonresident licenses
are taxed. A direct correlation between boaters and anglers is also assumed. A license
fee acts as a gatekeeper to other regional economic activity. If the angler does not show
up, expenditures on hotels, gas, etc., will fall accordingly. The number of visiting anglers
decreases with the price of a license. The demand curve for nonresident licenses is given
by
license = license0(1 + NR)  (29)
where  is the elasticity of demand for nonresident licenses, license is the number of
nonresident licenses bought, license0 is the number of nonresident licenses bought in our
benchmark year, and NR is the tax on nonresident licenses. Constant ratios of nonresident
licenses to out-of-state boaters and total expenditures are maintained in the model such
that XNR = PV Elicense and n = BPLlicense where PV E is per visitor expenditure
and BPL is number of nonresident boats per nonresident license in the benchmark data.
Demand equations are parameterized using data on nonresident shing licenses from the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services (USFWS) National Fishing License Report (grant program
9500). According to the USFWS, 758,207 nonresident licenses were sold by states in the
Columbia River Basin in 2002.13 These angler gures were converted into their economic
fore, match the two sets using the Bureau of Labor Statistics consumer price index ination calculator
between data years (http://www.bls.gov/bls/ination.htm). If one of our income ranges includes more
than one of Ballard et al.'s income classes, we take the average of the parameters in those classes.
13For demand and tax revenue, we use number of anglers given by USFWS. For probability of invasion
we use number of boaters given by Bossenbroek. We assume the elasticity of boaters and anglers is the
same, though since boaters likely spend more per trip than non-boaters, their elasticity is likely to be lower.
20activity equivalent, matching them to the recreational shing sector, to merge them into
the CGE model.
We assume state agencies issue shing licenses and collect the tax to reduce state labor
taxes. Thus, we add the following constraint to the state government's decision problem
G = LwL + NRPNRlicense (30)
where the left side represents government revenues initially composed of only the labor tax
and the right side represents revenues under the new tax policy. PNR is the price for a
nonresident license in the Columbia River Basin evaluated at the average during our data
years.
4.1 Results
The key result is that corrective environmental taxes do not always lead to welfare im-
provements. Net changes in welfare to residents depend on the elasticity of demand for
nonresident angling and the relative magnitudes of the revenue recycling eect, the posi-
tive externality in the primary welfare eect, and the negative externality in the primary
welfare eect. We use our CGE model to measure the relative sizes of each of the eects
for the Columbia River Basin.
Without a tax on shing, threat of a zebra mussel invasion causes a $4.16 million welfare
loss across all households. This serves as our base for policy comparisons. Figure 1 shows
the change in welfare to resident households following a tax on nonresident licenses for a
range of semi-log coecients on price near the values estimated by preliminary work14,
0.005, 0.01, and 0.02. Total welfare change is shown in Panel A; the revenue recycling,
positive externality in the primary welfare eect, and negative externality in the primary
14see supplemental material
21welfare eects are shown in Panels B-D.
As the tax rate on nonresident shing increases, the number of out-of-region boaters
decreases, decreasing the probability of invasion. Tax revenues from license sales are used
to reduce household labor taxes, providing the primary means of compensating resident
households. For high elasticities ( = 0:02), taxing nonresident shermen causes a net
decline in welfare among Columbia River Basin households. For low elasticities ( = 0:005),
a tax of 400 percent on nonresident shermen maximizes welfare of regional households. For
 = 0:01, which based on our analysis and comparison with other studies closely matches
the true value for nonresident anglers in the Columbia River Basin, welfare is maximized
at a tax rate of 175 percent, or $22.58 added to the average price of a nonresident license.
A 175 percent tax will increase total welfare by $3.9 million over the no-tax scenario. We
decompose these eects into the three parts.
4.2 Revenue recycling - Labor taxes are reduced causing household in-
come to go up, increasing overall welfare.
To measure the size of the welfare eect from tax redistribution for the Columbia River
Basin we rst assume taxes from nonresident anglers are not used to adjust the labor tax
or given back to the households in any way. The dierence between welfare changes under
this scenario and one in which revenues are used to lower labor taxes gives us the welfare
gains to households of our compensation scheme and is shown in Panel B. This welfare
change is comparable to the rst two terms of equation (13) and measures the welfare
gains from reducing the distortion in the labor market. With lower labor taxes, the real
wage rises, households supply more labor, and household incomes rise.
224.3 Positive externality in primary welfare eect - Taxing nonresident
consumption causes demand for locally owned factors to fall, reduc-
ing overall welfare.
Nonresident demand brings money into the Columbia River Basin. These additional rev-
enues are a positive externality from nonresident demand, and taxing nonresidents will
decrease the benets to Columbia River Basin households. These changes are the positive
externality in the primary welfare eect. We measure the size of this eect by setting the
probability of a dreissenid invasion to zero but still levying a tax on nonresident consump-
tion. The tax revenues are not given back to the household or used to adjust government
expenditures in any way. Without an impact from the lost productivity of an invasion,
this measure gives the welfare eect of imposing the tax, shown in Panel C. For highly
elastic demand, welfare losses are signicant. Visitors respond to the tax by reducing
consumption, causing labor demanded and income to households to fall.
4.4 Negative externality in the primary welfare eect - Taxing nonresi-
dent consumption decreases the probability of invasion, causing over-
all welfare to rise.
The nal component of welfare change is the benets to households from correcting the
externality and is the part of the primary welfare eect from the negative externality. To
measure this eect, we take the dierence of an impact with a probability of invasion and
a tax policy and an impact with just the tax policy and no probability of invasion, both
without redistribution of tax revenues. This gives a measure of the externality with a tax
policy. Subtracting this number from the impact without any policy ($4.16 million) gives
the reduction in the externality from the tax, shown in Panel D. Higher elasticities lead to
larger reductions in nonresident visitors and larger benets from correcting the negative
23externality.
In summary, examining Figure 1, taxing nonresident consumption does not ensure wel-
fare gains for Columbia River Basin households. For very low elasticities, welfare changes
are positive due to the ability to raise tax revenues and correct the preexisting distortion
in the labor market. As the elasticity increases the ability to correct the externality is im-
portant to achieving welfare gains - up to a point. If demand is highly elastic, the number
of visitors falls enough to cause large drops in regional production and net welfare losses.
An extreme policy alternative to taxation is completely shutting down the shery to
outside anglers. This will drive the probability of invasion to zero (or near zero) but all
tourist revenues associated with recreational shing will be lost. Our model predicts that
such a measure would lead to $15.7 million in welfare losses. Comparing this to the $4.16
million in lost welfare that results from the threat of invasion, the non-market value of
preventing a dreissenid invasion into the Columbia River Basin would have to be about
2.7 times the market impact to justify shutting down the shery. For perspective, our
model estimates that costs associated with the most recent Biological Opinion [27] aimed
at salmon recovery in the Columbia River Basin will lead to market-based welfare losses of
$18.5 million.15 More moderate policy options include the installation of monitor stations
and cleaning facilities at boat launch sites. This would have the eect of imposing additional
costs on all anglers, reducing their numbers, in exchange for a reduced probability of
introduction per boat. Lower probability of invasion would reduce the wage distortion
resulting from the rms' uncertainty, leading to large-scale benets. Because the policy
is not revenue generating, however, it cannot oset preexisting distortions in the labor
market. Policy makers would have to consider sensitivity of welfare changes between the
15Estimates on the non-market to market costs of climate change, for example, give ratios between 1-1.5
and 4-1 [30], and nonmarket value of in-stream uses of water are reported to be 1.5 times the market value
[20].
24two methods of reducing the probability of invasion, reducing the per boat probability
versus reducing the number of boats entering the basin. We do not have data on boater
reactions to cleaning stations, though this is a worthwhile extension for policy comparisons
and comprehensive cost-benet analysis.
Two caveats are worth noting. First, we do not address the welfare of nonresidents of
the Columbia River Basin. Taxing nonresidents is likely to cause welfare losses to frequent
visitors. Second, levying a tax on licenses sold by states in the Columbia River Basin will
decrease visitors trips into the basin, but we cannot be sure they will stay home. The
problem may shift elsewhere, raising the threat of invasion into other pristine bodies of
water.
5 Conclusion
Invasive species can be introduced to ecosystems through indirect relations to trade. For
aquatic mussels, recreational boating and shing by tourists is the main threat. To the
degree that economists connect these invasions to imports in modeling and policy responses,
resulting policies may miss the mark and cause even greater economic harm. The trade
literature makes a strong case for modeling local services provided to visitors as regional
exports, for all of the same reasons recreational shing and boating by out-of-state residents
should also be modeled as exports. Levying taxes on these activities may reduce the risk
of invasion, but it can also cause large drops in regional income.
Our example of the Columbia River Basin highlights the danger in uniformly prescribing
a corrective tax to the problem of invasive species. For highly inelastic demand, introducing
a tax on non-resident shing licenses may help alleviate the damages from dreissenids. The
tax can reduce the probability of invasion and the negative externality non-resident anglers
bring to the economy, but if non-resident anglers are sensitive to taxes levied on the license
25price, the area will see large reductions in visits from outside anglers and drops in household
income. Furthermore, reduced visitor numbers in the Columbia River Basin are likely to
lead to increased numbers of visitors in other Western waters. Ultimately, policies limited
to the Columbia River Basin will be self-defeating. As anglers substitute other shing
holes for those of the Columbia River Basin they increase the probability of an invasion
into those areas, and policy makers in the Columbia River Basin will have to monitor
movements from these new dreissenid sources.
A Appendix derivation of welfare eects
To examine the welfare eects, the resident's utility function is totally dierentiated and
divided by . As  is the marginal utility of wealth, dU
 is the marginal change in resident













Substituting in the resident rst order conditions, recalling dQ = 0 in equilibrium, and
setting the price of the good as the numeraire, gives
dU

= dXR + w(1   L)dl (A.2)
Totally dierentiating the resident's time constraint and substituting for dl in the welfare
equation,
dT = dl + dL = 0 (A.3)
dU

= dXR   w(1   L)dL (A.4)
26Incorporating the rst order conditions of the rm
dU

= dXR   [ + (1   )](1   L)dL (A.5)
 is the equilibrium probability of invasion from the rm's rst order conditions and is
associated with the prot maximizing level of output.
It is useful to express welfare with as few variables as possible, and preferably in vari-
ables exogenous to the resident household. This requires several steps. First, the resource
constraint is totally dierentiated and used to substitute for dXR.
dL = dXR + dXNR (A.6)
Second, the government budget constraint is totally dierentiated. Since revenues from
the environmental tax are used to lower the labor tax, total government revenues remain
unchanged.
dG = NRdXNR + dNRXNR + Ld(wL) + wLdL = 0 (A.7)
Subtracting dG from the welfare function leaves it unchanged. Solving for the welfare
change with tax eects,
dU

=  dXNR(1 + NR)   dNRXNR   wLdL   LLdw + (1   )dL (A.8)
















Dening the price elasticity for visitor demand as  = dXNR
d(1+NR)
1+NR
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Figure 1: Welfare eects of environmental tax
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